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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at discussing the usage by Davidson as to events of 
Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. According to Davidson, we 
are ontologically committed to the existence of events as individuals as 
we employ literally terms such as ‘Caesar’s death’, for instance. David-
son extends this analysis to actions as well, since actions are human 
events. One of the consequences of this view is that psychology deals 
with individual events in a non-lawful way. An alternative view is here 
proposed, based on a complementary criterion, namely ontological den-
sity, according to which from the point of view of a given theory, we can 
always distinguish between events (or phenomena) and individuals 
(entities) among the overall occurrences described by the theory. Some 
consequences of this alternative view of psychology as a science dealing 
lawfully with general human events are also explored here.  
 
 
Introduction: Quine’s Axe — in Davidson’s Hands 
 
The question in the title of this paper is given a direct answer by 
Davidson who, in this connection, follows Quine’s criterion of on-
tological commitment. If our talk about events such as human ac-
tions is to be interpreted literally, says Davidson, we are ontologi-
cally committed to the existence of events, in addition to material 
bodies, for instance. In this case, events are the individuals we talk 
about. Our language furnishes us terms denoting such individuals, 
such as ‘Caesar’s meeting with Brutus in the Forum’, ‘the stabbing 
of Caesar by Brutus’, etc. Any other deviant interpretation would 
imply not to take seriously — i.e. literally — our talk about human 
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actions and the terms denoting them.  
Apparently, Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment is 
obligatory whenever we are supposed to use language literally to 
denote certain entities and describe them, as he argues for in his 
classic “On What There Is” (Quine 1980 [1953]). One of the con-
sequences of adopting such a criterion is to rule out useless meta-
physical discussions, to give up trying to figure out the structure of 
the world, and to stop trying to set apart reality from fiction. The 
criterion does the job, and categories such as those ones just re-
ferred to become internal to our talk and are theory dependent 
categories.  
However, that criterion leaves certain cases without a good 
solution, even though we are conscious that we are just dealing 
with our practice of language and our use of certain terms. A case 
at hand is to compare our talk about events, according to Quine’s 
criterion, with the talk about certain individuals or entities that, 
from the point of view of a given theory, exist. I give just below an 
example. Thus, Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment can’t 
be taken without reference to his own thesis of ontological relativ-
ity (Quine 1969).  
This is another feature of Quine’s thought I resort to, which is 
useful to correct indiscriminate and even counter-intuitive uses of 
the criterion of ontological commitment. Consider, for instance, 
the possibility of reifying, which is a subject especially significant in 
discussions on the foundations of the social sciences and human 
action, exactly the area in which Davidson employs Quine’s crite-
rion. Thus, the relativity to a given theory prevents us from such 
kind of metaphysical unwelcome consequences.  
Suppose a physical theory — similar to Newtonian mechanics 
— dealing with the behavior of macroscopic bodies. One of that 
theory's models consists in two billiard balls, the first one being at 
rest relative to a given point of reference, the second one moving in 
a trajectory leading to a collision with the first one. In addition, the 
model invites us to suppose that those balls are rigid spheres, and 
that after colliding the moving ball stops and the resting ball begins 
to move. The model’s setting contains at least two individuals, the 
two balls, and at least an occurrence, the collision between them, 
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in which, according to the theory, the movement of the first ball is 
communicated to the second one.  
I am considering here what Davidson would be willing to call a 
physical event, an event referred to by the term ‘the collision be-
tween those two balls’. For Quine, those balls belong to that the-
ory's ontology, and they are in a relation that can be described by 
the theory. According to Davidson’s use of Quine’s criterion of 
ontological commitment, however, our talk about such a physical 
occurrence commits us to the existence of physical events as indi-
viduals. That is to say, strictly speaking, there are at least three 
entities, namely the two balls and the collision between them.  
Now, from the point of view of a physicist who formulates or 
accepts that theory, and who studies the setting corresponding to 
the model, the question is “How serious is the assertion that in 
addition to the two balls there is a third entity, namely the collision 
between them?” Surely, that physicist wouldn’t believe that he 
talks of three individuals, but two individuals and a relation be-
tween them. The physicist would feel quite uncomfortable in the 
use of Quine’s criterion. However, if constrained by a philosopher 
to become conscious of his ontological commitments, the physicist 
can acknowledge, after all, that his talk imply the existence of colli-
sions between the balls. But, in this case, he could be apt to make a 
distinction between two kinds of existence.  
The philosopher, in his turn, can even be sympathetic with the 
physicist’s rising ontological concerns, but he considers that 
Quine’s criterion, acquiesced in by Davidson, doesn’t allow us to 
make that further distinction. According to Davidson, both the 
balls and their collision are individuals — and that is the end of the 
discussion. Indeed, we can slice a cheese with an axe or with a sur-
geon’s scalpel or even with a kitchen knife; of course, the last pos-
sibility is the ordinary way of doing it. In this paper, I compare what 
Davidson is trying to do with Quine’s criterion to the situation of 
slicing a cheese with an axe. It is up to the reader to decide what 
the alternative criterion to be proposed here is like, and whether it 
is like to slice a cheese with a knife, or rather with a scalpel. To the 
ordinary purposes of life, such as preparing a sandwich, if knifes are 
nearby, how serious can be a person who wants to slice a cheese 
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with a scalpel or with an axe?  
Especially as to human action and the foundations of psychol-
ogy, exactly Davidson’s concerns, it would be in order to ask how 
close — or how far — is then his philosophy of psychology to the 
ordinary purposes of life, i.e. to human action itself. In the next 
section, I review Davidson’s arguments for the idea that events are 
individuals. In section 2, I propose an alternative criterion, by 
means of which I seek an ontological analysis more improved than 
that one by the criterion of ontological commitment. In section 3, I 
briefly review Davidson’s philosophy of psychology. In the last sec-
tion, I propose an alternative analysis of human action and I briefly 
discuss, from that perspective, the foundations of psychology and 
the social sciences.   
 
 
1. Davidson and the Individuation of Events 
 
In his discussions on the individuation of events, Davidson main-
tains not only that actions are individuals but that, consequently, 
psychology is different from physics, since physics deals with gen-
eral cases, according to laws, whereas psychology deals with singu-
lar cases and is incapable of achieving strict causal laws.  
Davidson is initially concerned with the logical form of action 
sentences, as he discusses in essay 6 (and in the other essays of the 
second part) of his Essays on Actions and Events (1980). As op-
posed to the analysis due to Antony Kenny, Roderick Chisholm, G. 
H. von Wright e Hans Reichenbach, whose difficulties Davidson 
points out in his discussion, he presents his interpretation accord-
ing to which action verbs are identified with (action) predicates, in 
which there is a place for events (Davidson 1980, p. 119). For in-
stance, the sentence ‘I drove my car to the tunnel’ would be trans-
lated into the following: ‘there is an event x such that x is the driv-
ing by me of my car and x is to the tunnel’.  
According to Davidson, this theory has the great advantage of 
allowing a standard interpretation of truth for action sentences, 
using Tarki’s definition of truth. The price to pay, as Davidson 
himself also acknowledges, is obviously that events must count as 
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individuals.  
In the first place, this account implies the distinction between 
facts and events, which is not a common practice in the literature. 
The terms ‘fact’ and ‘event’, customarily, are interchanged without 
further reflection. In addition, some philosophers do identify facts 
and events, such as Austin, who is mentioned by Davidson. Austin 
maintains that phenomena, events, situations and states of affairs, 
all of them, are facts (Austin 1979 [1961], p. 156). According to 
this approach, says Davidson, both events and facts correspond to 
whole sentences. Davidson denies this thesis, and argues as follows:  
 
facts, if such there are, correspond to whole sentences, while 
events, if such there are, correspond to singular terms like ‘Caesar’s 
death’, and are quantified over in sentences such as ‘Caesar died.’ 
(Davidson 1980, p. 135.) 
 
In this connection, Davidson says he is following Ramsey’s ar-
guments (1950, pp. 138ff). In this case, maintains Davidson, ‘died’ 
(in ‘Caesar died’) is taken as a two-place predicate, with a place for 
‘Caesar’ and another one for a variable that ranges over events. 
Consequently, there is an event that is the dying by Caesar, and 
which corresponds to the singular term ‘Caesar’s death’. In addi-
tion, the whole sentence — ‘Caesar died’ — is an existential sen-
tence. According to this interpretation, argues Davidson, there is 
no problem in making the singular term ‘Caesar’s death’ correspond 
to a particular event; and this is how we can “treat events seriously 
as individuals,” says Davidson (1980, p. 135).  
However, what good reasons could we have to introduce an 
ontology of events along these lines? Davidson says that this is the 
only way to solve a simple, recurring problem, which can be stated 
as follows. Intuitively, the sentence ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar in the 
back in the Forum with a knife’ entails ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar in 
the back in the Forum’, and both entail ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar in 
the back’, and all these entail ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar’. Yet, the 
ordinary way of symbolizing these sentences in a first order lan-
guage reveals no logical connection between them (Davidson 1980, 
p. 136).  
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This problem is raised not only as to action verbs, says David-
son; and it can be solved by his approach as follows: ‘There exists 
an event that is a stabbing of Caesar by Brutus event, it is an into 
the back of Caesar event, it took place in the Forum, and Brutus 
did it with a knife’. This formulation, in its turn, can easily be sym-
bolized in the way referred to above, revealing the logical form of 
the original sentence.  
However, in the second place, Davidson’s approach involves 
also the problem of individuating events. In this regard, he argues 
as follows:  
 
I am myself inclined to think we can do as well for events generally 
as we can for physical objects generally (which is not very well), 
and can do much better for sorts of events, like deaths and meet-
ings, just as we can for sorts of physical objects, like tables and peo-
ple. (Davidson 1980, p. 137.) 
 
According to Davidson, this problem consists in furnishing cri-
teria to say when a sentence (referring to a given event) is true 
(1980, p. 146). To this purpose, it is useful to know the logical form 
of sentences such as those ones mentioned above. However, David-
son acknowledges that the problem of finding out the logical form 
of sentences is but the first part of the ontological problem that is 
to be faced. In this connection, he comments as follows:  
 
On the score of ontology, too, the study of logical form can carry us 
only a certain distance. If I am right, we cannot give a satisfactory 
account of the semantics of certain sentences without recognizing 
that if any of those sentences are true, there must exist such things 
as events and actions. Given this much, a study of event sentences 
will show a great deal about what we assume to be true concerning 
events. But deep metaphysical problems will remain as to the na-
ture of these entities, their mode of individuation, their relations to 
other categories. Perhaps we will find a way of reducing events to 
entities of other kinds, for example, sets of points in space-time, or 
ordered n-tuples of times, physical objects, and classes of ordered 
n-tuples of such. Successful reductions along these lines may, in an 
honoured tradition, be advertised as showing that there are no 
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such things as events. As long as the quantifiers and variables re-
main in the same places, however, the analysis of logical form will 
stick. (Davidson 1980, p. 146.) 
 
In addition to accounting for the logical form of event sen-
tences, what reasons could we have then, Davidson himself asks, to 
take seriously events as entities? It is well known that he maintains 
that a good reason is to have a suitable theory of action; and this is 
not the case if we can’t talk literally of the same action under dif-
ferent descriptions (Davidson 1980, p. 164). Now, there are no 
descriptions or redescriptions without certain entities that are de-
scribed and redescribed. Considering the specific case of action and 
the human mind, Davidson maintains that, such as when we iden-
tify a mental event with a physiological one, to maintain or to deny 
theories of that kind (including Davidson’s anomalous monism) is 
possible only if events are taken as individuals (Davidson 1980, p. 
165).  
In order to cope with that problem Davidson resorts again to 
Quine, adopting the perspective expressed in the dictum “No en-
tity without identity.” Thus, what are the necessary and sufficient 
conditions to identify events? An answer to this must fill in the 
blank in the following (Davidson 1980, p. 172):  
 
If x and y are events, then x = y if and only if ___. 
 
Davidson discusses many different answers to that question, 
especially Strawson’s theory in Individuals (1959). Davidson con-
siders five answers, rejecting the first four, and arguing for the last 
one, which are as follows (Davidson 1980, pp. 173ss):  
 
(1) events as changes in substances: if an event a is a change in 
some substance, then  a = b only if b is also a change in the 
same substance; 
(2) events located in the same place: two events are identical only 
if they are located in the same place;  
(3) events located in the same moment of time: if two events are 
identical, they consume identical stretches of time; 
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(4) events located in space and time together: if two events are 
identical, they occupy exactly the same time and the same 
space;  
(5) events as causes and effects: two events are identical if and only 
if they have exactly the same causes and the same effects.  
 
Davidson gives a number of reasons to dispose of the first four 
alternatives, but it seems to me that it is not necessary to review his 
arguments in detail. As for the last option, which Davidson 
chooses, he acknowledges that it contains some circularity, but he 
argues that certainly such circularity is not formal, since the crite-
rion needed can be formulated as follows (Davidson 1980, p. 179): 
 
(x = y) if and only if ((z) (z caused x iff z caused y) and 
(z) (x caused z iff y caused z)). 
 
On the right of the biconditional, no identities appear, and this 
means that any circularity doesn’t yield a logical catastrophe to the 
analysis.  
Notwithstanding, that circularity is deep and put the doctrine 
in jeopardy. In essay 7 of his book, “Causal Relations,” Davidson 
explains causes and effects, in their turn, in connection with the 
notion of event. In addition, even taking his criterion not only as 
correct but also as useful, Davidson acknowledges that it is not the 
only possible way to identify events. He comments:  
 
Perhaps sameness of causal relations is the only condition always 
sufficient to establish sameness of events (sameness of location in 
space and time may be another). But this should not be taken to 
mean that the only way of establishing, or supporting, a claim that 
two events are identical is by giving causal evidence. On the con-
trary, logic alone, or logic plus physics, or almost anything else, may 
help do the job, depending on the descriptions provided. What I 
do want to propose is that the causal nexus provides for events a 
‘comprehensive and continuously usable framework’ for the identi-
fication and description of events analogous in many ways to the 
space-time coordinate system for material objects. (Davidson 1980, 
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pp. 179–80.) 
 
To sum up, Davidson’s argument here is that his criterion to 
identify and describe events is better than other ones because, ul-
timately, it does the same job as the criterion based on space-time 
coordinates does in order to identify material bodies. Now, I argue 
below that a criterion for the latter purpose, in a certain way, is also 
a criterion for the former, that is to say it identifies events as a kind 
of relation between material bodies. Thus, Davidson is perhaps 
multiplying the entities beyond necessity.  
Davidson’s argument, after all, is that, supposing that the crite-
rion of ontological commitment is correct, even if we remember 
that it is applicable always in connection with a given theory, we 
are committed to the existence of events as individuals, since the 
best theory at hand leads us to do so. Now, I argue in the remain-
der of this paper that there are suitable alternatives in both re-
spects, that is to say as to both the criterion of ontological com-
mitment and a theory of action.  
 
 
2. The Criterion of Ontological Density 
 
Let me introduce a criterion capable of helping the physicist in the 
above discussion. I hope this criterion might help also those who 
want to talk of human action, especially in the area of empirical 
psychology, without any obligation of accepting some consequences 
of Davidson’s account, such as the existence of human actions as 
individuals.  
I don’t intend my criterion to replace Quine’s, but to comple-
ment it in those cases where his criterion doesn’t suffice to make 
rather accurate distinctions. Before I introduce my criterion, let me 
propose the following uses for a number of terms. From a phe-
nomenological point of view, there are certain occurrences (or 
happenings or episodes). A first sort of occurrence is events (or 
phenomena), such as those terms are used in scientific theories. 
Another sort of occurrence in the world described by a given the-
ory is entities (or things). Relations are events or phenomena, in-
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volving entities or things. Individuals are put in relations in virtue 
of their properties (or capacities).  
Such conventions deviate from the use by some philosophers, 
and correspond to others’ use. Particularly, the term ‘fact’ (I re-
ferred to in section 1 as discussed by Davidson in connection with 
Austin’s and Ramsey’s interpretations) is used here with a specific - 
but also well supported - meaning, as an equivalent for ‘event’ and 
‘phenomenon’. From a strict linguistic viewpoint, in response to 
Davidson’s arguments against Austin and for Ramsey, I don’t take 
a term such as ‘Caesar’s death’ to be a name of an event, as David-
son does, but as an alternative way — allowed by ordinary language 
— of saying the same as ‘Caesar died’.  
This point takes us back to an already mentioned issue: the 
unwelcome reifications. To suppose that the noun ‘death’ denotes 
an entity (in this case, according to Davidson, an event) — and 
that, therefore, ‘Caesar’s death’ names an individual event — 
seems to me to be similar to the sort of reification Carnap de-
nounced (1959) as regards metaphysics. Heidegger, for instance, 
assumes that the term ‘nothing’ — occurring in certain current 
expressions and sentences (such as in ‘there is nothing in that 
room’) as an equivalent for the negation particles (‘no’, ‘not’) - 
refers to an entity. As I argued above, this kind of reification might 
be an unwelcome consequence of an indiscriminate use of the cri-
terion of ontological commitment.  
If the meanings of the terms I proposed are acceptable, provi-
sionally, then we can say that Quine’s criterion of ontological 
commitment, such as it’s used by Davidson in the case of human 
action, reveals our commitment to the existence of occurrences, 
but not necessarily individuals. Maybe it is unusual to talk of the 
existence of occurrences, and probably it is more usual to say that 
the criterion of ontological commitment points to occurrences, or, 
more exactly, reveals that we identify and describe occurrences. 
After all, this is due to some ambiguity of the verb ‘to exist’, and my 
criterion is intended to lessen it. In other words, ‘to exist’, as ap-
plied either to entities or to events, doesn’t have the same meaning.  
Before I discuss this issue in detail, let me get back to the ex-
ample of the billiard balls. Using the criterion of ontological com-
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mitment, that physicist must recognize that both the balls and the 
collision between them are occurrences (in the sense referred to 
above). In addition, that physicist identifies the balls as individuals, 
entities or things, and the collision between them as an event, phe-
nomenon or relation. Now, the philosopher questions the physicist 
as follows: “Based on which criterion is such a distinction possible?”  
The question is rather pertinent, and the physicist can then be 
aided by the following criterion of ontological density: occurrences 
of type 1 (entities, things, individuals) are ontologically denser than 
occurrences of type 2 (events, phenomena, relations). The differ-
ence between the two types is that we can assign properties to oc-
currences of type 1, but not to occurrences of type 2. That is to say, 
according to a certain theory, literally speaking, irreducible occur-
rences are given properties. According to the theory, it is not possi-
ble to show that irreducible occurrences are relations between fur-
ther entities. So, irreducible occurrences do count as individuals.  
The idea of such a criterion of ontological density — identify-
ing ontological nodes in the world described by a given theory — is 
reminiscent of a distinction put forward by Claude Bernard (1879, 
pp. 461–2) in the nineteenth century. According to the founding 
father of experimental physiology, a scientific program, at each 
moment of its historical development, always distinguishes between 
complex and simple facts. For Bernard, complex facts are those 
ones that, by means of a given theory’s analytical tools, can be re-
duced to simpler facts. Simple facts, relative to that moment of the 
development of the research program, can’t be reduced to still sim-
pler facts. Now, Bernard calls such simple facts properties.  
Like Bernard’s distinction, my criterion of ontological density is 
also relative. The distinction between events, on the one hand, and 
individuals, on the other, is relative to a given theory or to a certain 
moment of the development of a scientific research program. This 
is how we can say that, according to a given theory (or class of 
theories), there exist occurrences denser than others. The denser 
occurrences are those identified by the theory as entities, the oc-
currences that are given properties. The less dense occurrences are 
those ones depending on the properties of the denser occurrences, 
i.e. the occurrences of type 2 are relations between occurrences of 
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type 1. According to this criterion, individuals are, therefore, onto-
logically denser than events. According to the criterion of onto-
logical commitment, both individuals and events exist; according 
to the criterion of ontological density, they both don’t exist the 
same way.  
That physicist would surely be rather at ease with this addi-
tional criterion. He would recognize that he doesn’t talk of the 
billiard balls and the collision between them as occurrences of the 
same type in the world described by his theory. The balls have cer-
tain properties allowing them to be in certain relations, for in-
stance, to collide so that the movement of one of them is commu-
nicated to the other. I think my criterion is reasonable from the 
point of view of common sense as well. For instance, as we talk 
about human beings' actions, we don’t suppose that human beings 
and their actions exist in the same way. Human beings and their 
actions are occurrences in the world described by a psychological 
(or sociological or economic) theory, but human beings and their 
actions are occurrences of different types in the world describe by 
such theories. Notwithstanding, the philosopher is surely still cau-
tious as to this additional criterion. Thus, it is fair to try to shed 
some further light on it.  
The first question our philosopher certainly wants to raise is 
that there is a certain ambiguity in the very term used above, ‘onto-
logical density’. Indeed, in at least two different senses we can say 
that a given occurrence is ontologically denser than another one. 
Consider two rooms, the first one containing a billiard table and 
two balls on it, and the second one containing two people talking 
to each other. According to the criterion here proposed, the first 
room has three individuals, and the second room has two. There-
fore, the first room would be considered ontologically denser than 
the second, in virtue of its having more individuals. However, the 
relationships between the individuals in the second room (two 
people talking to each other) amount to a richer class of occur-
rences. Of course, we can take each statement made by those two 
people as a linguistic occurrence. Thus, we could then argue that a 
criterion respecting the number of occurrences in each setting, 
instead of the number of individuals, could still maintain the same 
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idea of ontological density, and it would be closer to the criterion of 
ontological commitment, in its turn.  
I see both ways of interpreting ontological density arguable. 
The first one is clearly an ontic interpretation, since it is based on 
the number of individuals there is according to a given theory or 
class of theories. According to this interpretation, the first room is 
ontologically denser then the second because it contains more in-
dividuals (a table and two billiard balls, which are individuals for a 
physical theory, since they are macroscopic bodies). The second 
interpretation referred to above is nomic, for it is based on the 
number of stable relations between the individuals of a given set-
ting, which are described by a certain theory (by means of lawful 
statements). According to this second interpretation of the crite-
rion, the second room is denser than the first one, since the second 
room exhibits a greater number of lawful occurrences (according to 
a psycholinguistic theory, for instance).  
As a matter of fact, both interpretations complement each 
other. For the stable, lawfully describable relationships of certain 
individuals by means of a given theory are due to the fact that such 
individuals have certain properties or capacities. The second room 
(with two people talking) seems to be denser when we use a nomic 
version of the criterion just because we don’t describe all possible 
relations between the individuals in the first room (the table and 
the billiard balls). Now, it is the models we construct based on a 
given theory that point out to us the possible relations between 
individuals. Thus, a priori, we can’t know whether a physical theory 
used in the case of the first room doesn’t lead to a greater number 
of occurrences (between the balls and the table) than those identi-
fied as to the second room by means of a psycholinguistic theory 
(used to describe the relations between two people in conversa-
tion). Since the nomic version of the criterion must refer to proper-
ties of the individuals, in order to describe their relationships, this 
version of the criterion doesn’t add anything that wasn’t already 
included by means of the ontic version of the criterion.  
The ontic and nomic interpretations of the criterion of onto-
logical density are complementary in another sense. In addition to 
the above mentioned meanings of terms occurring in like discus-
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sions, let us use the term ‘system’ to mean any stable relation be-
tween a number of parts, if such a relation exhibits a certain repro-
ducible pattern or structure. Such a pattern may be lawfully de-
scribed from the point of view of a given theory, and such internal 
description may be richer than any other possible external lawful 
descriptions, i.e. descriptions of the relations of the system consid-
ered as related to other ones. In this case, we can employ the same 
term as Nancy Cartwright (2003, passim, esp. pp. 49ff). We can 
then talk of nomological machines, i.e. settings of objects that ex-
hibit certain laws. According to Cartwright, models in mathemati-
cal sciences (such as physics and economics) are projects of no-
mological machines. For instance, in this sense of the term, as 
Cartwright herself says, a nomological machine can be our solar 
system, which exhibits Kepler’s laws.  
Compared with such nomological machines, according to the 
interpretation here proposed, a system can be identified with an 
individual or with a collection of events. Taken as an individual, 
the system is given certain properties. For instance, the gravita-
tional system containing the Earth and the Moon may be given the 
property — or capacity, as Cartwright (2002 and 2003) prefers to 
say — of gravitating around the Sun. However, if the same system 
is taken as a collection of events — not properties — then the 
Earth and the Moon, as individuals put in relation, in their turn, 
must have certain properties responsible for putting them into a 
given relation (for instance, their masses). The interpretation to be 
adopted for such a system and the possibility of integrating it in a 
larger system, as a subsystem, are contingent, empirical issues; an 
answer to such questions depend on the theory to be adopted, on 
the laws such a theory imply, and on our capacity of observation 
and measurement.  
If the above reflections are acceptable, then we can have a fur-
ther formulation of the criterion of ontological density, which in-
corporates both the nomic and the ontic interpretations referred to 
above into a single version. A system is considered an individual 
(or occurrence of type 1) or a collection of events (an occurrence 
of type 2) depending on the theory adopted. In other words, a sys-
tem is identified with a collection of occurrences, and it is the the-
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ory we adopt that tells us whether we must identify it with a collec-
tion of events or with an individual. In addition, as long as an indi-
vidual is given properties, such properties are to be taken as possi-
bilities of relations with other individuals.  
Consequently, according to the same criterion of ontological 
density, individuals are ultimately occurrences that can be identi-
fied with certain systems. Since the distinction between individuals 
and events is relative, as said above, individuals can never be taken 
independently from the role they can play in certain systems. 
Physical systems and individuals are an example in order, but the 
same applies to social systems, i.e. systems described by means of 
theories belonging to the area of social sciences, even though this is 
not so clear to us. Anyway, reducing an individual to a collection of 
events, or conversely, taking a collection of events as an individual, 
these are possibilities that are dependent on the theories we use.  
When we talk about human individuals and their actions, we 
must resort to a psychological theory, in a broad sense, which can 
involve the many different aspects of the relationships between 
human individuals with each other and with non-human individu-
als (such as animals and material bodies), including features dealt 
with by economics, sociology, anthropology, history, etc., i.e. the 
social sciences generally speaking. It is in this broad sense that I 
employ the term ‘psychological theory’ in the remainder of this 
paper, where I discuss the distinction between human individuals, 
taken as psychological entities, and their actions, taken as psycho-
logical events.  
 
 
3. Davidson and Psychology as a Science of Individual  
Actions 
 
Part three of Davidson’s Essays on Action and Events collects some 
of his texts on the foundations of psychology and the nature of 
mind. Those essays explain especially Davidson’s doctrine, anoma-
lous monism, which is well known. Thus, I won’t comment on 
anomalous monism in detail, but just review some of its tenets that 
are directly connected with Davidson’s thesis that psychology is 
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devoted to explaining individual events. This is why psychology 
doesn’t have a lawful character.  
According to Davidson, mental events (including actions) are 
identical with physical events (1980, pp. 209ff, and 248ff); they are 
mental just in virtue of the way they are described. An event is 
physical if it is described by means of a vocabulary containing 
physical terms only; an event is mental if in its description there is 
at least one mental term, such as a propositional attitude verb. 
Since Davidson’s position is a monism of substance, it is compatible 
with the idea that mental events are, in a certain sense, superven-
ient or dependent on physical events (1980, pp. 214 and 253). But 
he denies the existence of psychophysical laws, i.e. laws connecting 
the mental to the physical. Davidson’s theory is a kind of heterodox 
identity theory of the mental (1980, p. 209).  
In addition, Davidson distinguishes two kinds of generaliza-
tions, homonomic and heteronomic (1980, pp. 219 and 230). Any 
generalization may point to a law, but the question is whether such 
law can be stated in the same vocabulary used in the generalization. 
In the positive case, the generalization is homonomic; and a num-
ber of instances are given by physical generalizations, which point 
to strict causal laws. As for psychology, however, possible laws are 
pointed out by heteronomic generalizations. In other words, even if 
based on the observation of overt behavior of human individuals 
we arrive at certain generalizations and raise the hypothesis that 
they point to psychological laws, such laws could be stated only in a 
different vocabulary, namely a vocabulary containing mental terms, 
which don't occur in the descriptions of overt behavior.  
This is why our approaches to physical or psychological phe-
nomena are essentially different, Davidson maintains. And he 
writes as follows: 
 
The heteronomic character of general statements linking the men-
tal and the physical traces back to this central role of translation in 
the description of all propositional attitudes, and to the indetermi-
nacy of translation. There are no strict psychophysical laws because 
of the disparate commitments of the mental and physical schemes. 
It is a feature of physical reality that physical change can be ex-
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plained by laws that connect it with other changes and conditions 
physically described. It is a feature of the mental that the attribu-
tion of mental phenomena must be responsible to the background 
of reasons, beliefs, and intentions of the individual. There cannot 
be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain alle-
giance to its proper source of evidence. (Davidson 1980, p. 222.) 
 
In addition, in another passage where Davidson recognizes his 
affiliation to a Kantian perspective as to the autonomy of human 
action, he says: 
 
Such accounts of intentional behaviour operate in a conceptual 
framework removed from the direct reach of physical law by de-
scribing both cause and effect, reason and action, as aspects of a 
portrait of a human agent. The anomalism of the mental is thus a 
necessary condition for viewing action as autonomous. (Davidson 
1980, p. 225.) 
 
Consequently, from Davidson’s viewpoint, psychology deals ex-
clusively with individual events and explains them in a non-
nomological way. Thus, a suitable theory of action must explain 
individual actions connecting them to individual beliefs, desires, 
intentions, decisions, etc., assigned to the agent (1980, p. 221). In 
addition, the explanation of human action must describe it as ra-
tional, as Davidson repeatedly argues for in essays 12–14 in that 
same book; and he gets back to the same point in essay 8 of Prob-
lems of Rationality (2004), denying the possibility of a science of 
rationality. In all those essays, Davidson restate his thesis according 
to which psychological phenomena are irreducible to physical phe-
nomena, and that social sciences can’t develop themselves into 
closed deterministic systems, as opposed to what is possible in the 
physical sciences.  
Davidson’s perspective can — and, in fact, it has been — criti-
cized from many different viewpoints, both by those who seek to 
argue for a strict or orthodox identity thesis between the physical 
and the mental and others who seek rather to maintain that there 
is a specific character of the mental, especially those who suppose 
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that social sciences and psychology can also be nomological sci-
ences, like the physical sciences. In the next section, I criticize 
Davidson’s view on psychology, reverting to some arguments I de-
veloped before (Dutra 2002 and 2003). In order to finish this sec-
tion, let me comment on some presuppositions of Davidson’s doc-
trine, which are unquestionable to him, but very doubtful from 
other perspectives.  
Davidson supposes that action is (or can be) consistent and ra-
tional. Accordingly, social sciences are given by him the task of 
accounting for such aspects of human behavior. From this point of 
view, psychology and the social sciences have a purely interpretive 
role to play, based on the attribution of intentionality to human 
individuals. Davidson’s doctrine about the foundations of social 
sciences and psychology is surely coherent and interesting. In addi-
tion, to a great extent, it retrieves much of traditional philosophy 
and common sense.  
Now, according to traditional philosophy, rational explanations 
(of action, for instance) are incompatible with causal explanations; 
and Davidson acquiesces in such a view. I mean the tradition that 
goes back to Galileo, according to which, in addition, there is also 
an incompatibility between mechanic explanations (in terms of 
efficient causes) and teleological explanations (in terms of final 
causes) of phenomena, as opposed to the Aristotelian tradition. 
Physical sciences must give us only mechanic explanations of the 
phenomena they investigate. In no other sense, the term ‘causal 
explanation’ is to be taken.  
It is a more recent consequence of such a view that as regards 
social sciences teleological explanations are possible only in a spe-
cific way, namely describing human actions as occurrences in the 
world that are directed to ends chosen by human agents. Such ends 
are, therefore, anticipated in an agent’s beliefs, desires, volitions, 
etc. That is to say, the only permitted kind of teleological explana-
tion is intentional. According to this view, causal (mechanic) ex-
planations may — and generally — resort to natural laws, but this 
is not possible in the case of intentional explanations. Davidson is 
one of the leading supporters of this doctrine.  
To sum up, Davidson’s view is based on two main theses. First, 
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there are no teleological laws; therefore, there are no intentional 
laws. In addition, in virtue of his adherence to a kind of metaphysi-
cal monism, which denies the existence of non-material substances 
and coincides, therefore, with materialism, Davidson maintains also 
that, as we talk of mental events, we talk of the same physical 
events, but described — i.e. construed — differently. Thus, what 
the physical sciences explain as movement, for instance, psychology 
may also explain as action. Taken as a mental event, action is 
nothing but the same physical event pointed out as if it were some-
thing else. Consequently, Davidson’s view of the social sciences 
seems to be just a way of comforting human impotency before a 
world of inexorable causal determinism. Davidson's occasional ref-
erences to Kant make this clear.  
As for the possibility of psychological laws, this is a matter of 
fact; and it depends on the capacity of certain research programs in 
psychology to state such laws. As opposed to Davidson’s stance, I 
don’t mean psychophysical laws, i.e. those laws showing that men-
tal events are subject to the same lawful regularities as their physi-
cal counterparts. I mean possible genuine psychological laws, i.e. 
laws describing certain regularities of behavior as lawful, but not in 
virtue of any connections with physical regularities. It is laws of this 
kind, not only as to psychology, but also as to the social sciences 
generally speaking, that are referred to by an alternative tradition, 
to which Neurath belongs. Neurath (1959 and 1970) maintains the 
independence of laws belonging to different spheres of phenomena 
— physical, biological, chemical, psychological, economic, etc. I 
adopt this stance in my discussion in the next section.  
Davidson’s concerns are essentially metaphysical, and they are 
not necessarily to be connected with conceptual discussions on the 
foundations of the sciences, physical or social. In a sense due to 
Quine, let us call discussions of this kind ontological. In this sense, 
as Neurath maintains, any laws to which the many different em-
pirical sciences refer are lawful regularities taking place in space 
and time. However, this doesn’t mean that psychological or socio-
logical laws are reducible to physical laws. In the same vein as 
Quine’s theses of ontological commitment and of ontological rela-
tivity, it seems to me, we can say that such laws describe occur-
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rences in the same world dealt with by physics, but according to 
different, alternative schemes. In addition, it is a matter of fact, not 
a question of philosophical principle, whether there are such scien-
tific research programs revealing psychological and sociological 
laws, in addition to the laws belonging to research programs in the 
physical sciences.  
 
 
4. A Nomological Alternative for Psychology:  
Social Systems 
 
If the criterion of ontological density I propose here is acceptable, 
then there is a solution to the problem raised by Davidson that is 
more acceptable than his own solution. Terms such as ‘Caesar’s 
death’ don’t refer to individual events. Their literal interpretations 
don't commit us to the existence of events as entities. Rather, ‘Cae-
sar’s death’ is given a meaning by courtesy of certain pragmatic 
features of our language and in virtue of the meaning of ‘Caesar 
died’. 
This solution takes the same line of thought adopted by Carnap 
(1959 [1932]) above mentioned, as to ‘in that room there is noth-
ing’. We can also say that in ordinary language this sentence is 
meaningful by courtesy of the pragmatics of speech; it is equivalent 
to the logically stricter ‘there is not any individual inside that 
room’. The criterion of ontological density aids us to avoid reifying 
as to the term ‘nothing’; and the same applies to ‘Caesar’s death’. 
In both cases, there is a theory according to which certain occur-
rences are (or aren’t) pointed out. Thus, ‘Caesar died’ and ‘Caesar’s 
death’ correspond equally to a given event, which can be described 
and redescribed in accordance with a certain theory or by means of 
that theory’s language.  
Consequently, Caesar’s death is not an individual, but an event 
that involves an individual, namely Caesar. More specifically, Cae-
sar’s death is an event occurring in Caesar taken as a system (or 
biological organism), and described by a (biological) theory. In the 
same way, we can say that Caesar’s murder is not an individual, but 
an event involving three individuals, namely Caesar, Brutus and a 
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knife. Such an event can be described by means of a forensic the-
ory, since a murder is a forensic category, in the first place. As for 
the specific case of human actions and of a possible psychological 
theory that enables us to describe them, let us see an alternative to 
Davidson’s view. 
In order for us to argue for the thesis that psychology can de-
scribe lawful regularities explained on the basis of genuine psycho-
logical laws, it is necessary that there are research programs in psy-
chology that are capable of stating such laws. As a matter of fact 
relative to the history of sciences, on the one hand, today there are 
reasonable doubts as to the existence of such programs and laws. 
On the other hand, there are also facts that encourage us to believe 
in such a possibility. There are a number of neo-Skinnerian behav-
iorist programs giving us reasons to be optimistic in this regard, 
such as Herrnstein’s (1977) and his collaborators’ program about 
the matching law.  
In the field of behavior theories there is also another alterna-
tive, argued for by Rachlin (1994), who adopts an Aristotelian per-
spective according to which it is possible to give teleological 
explanations to human behavior, which aren't intentional 
explanations in Davidson’s sense. According to Rachlin, the final 
cause of a behavioral event is a more comprehensive event in 
which the former fits. For instance, to play a movement of a certain 
symphony fits in playing the whole symphony. This is why we can 
say that the symphony is the final cause of one of its movements. 
To the extent that certain patterns of behavior fit in social, more 
comprehensive contexts, in a given social system, they are then 
teleologically explained. Rachlin himself calls his position 
teleological behaviorism, the same term chosen by Rowland Stout 
(1996). Both Stout and Rachlin acquiesce in an Aristotelian 
perspective as to causes, which deviates from the tradition going 
back to Galileo, acquiesced in by Davidson, and now deeply 
influenced by analyses such as Hume’s.  
My alternative analysis is partly based on the referred to teleo-
logical behaviorist doctrines, but I try to add some elements the 
mentioned writers don’t deal with, especially the lawful character 
of teleological explanations of action. In this connection, my ap-
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proach follows Neurath’s social behaviorism. Herrnstein’s theory is 
helpful as regards this problem, since it deals with lawful regulari-
ties in the field of microeconomics, which can be explained by a 
number of laws of behavior (such as the matching law) that are 
stated in the same rigorous mathematical formalism of laws in the 
physical sciences. It is worth remembering at this juncture that the 
very possibility of such exact laws in the field of the social sciences 
is also a matter of fact, and it depends on the development of re-
search programs in that field.  
This doesn’t rule out, however, the possibility of anticipating a 
general description of human action in lawful, teleological terms, 
which is based just on the way we ordinarily explain human action. 
It is true, on the one hand, such as intentionalists like Davidson 
maintain, that we ordinarily explain human actions attributing 
beliefs and intentions to human agents. But, on the other hand, to 
the extent that a number of social contexts are well known, allow-
ing to think that in such contexts it is not necessary to give inten-
tional explanations, we also explain human actions by means of 
final causes, exactly connecting the actions of certain agents to the 
social context in which they take place.  
In discussions about the ontology of the social sciences, it is 
common and recurring the problem of the possibility of there being 
social entities irreducible to mental entities (human individuals), 
i.e. entities that aren’t just totalities or conglomerates of human 
individuals, in which case social properties are irreducible to the 
mental properties of human individuals there involved. Davidson’s 
position imply a reduction thesis of the social to the mental, even 
though, on the other hand, as seen above, Davidson emphasizes 
that the mental is irreducible to the physical. Rather, based on my 
criterion of ontological density, I maintain an irreducibility thesis in 
both respects. Not only the mental is irreducible to the physical, 
but also the social is irreducible to the mental. I adopt a position 
similar to Ruben’s (1985), according to whom social entities are 
irreducible to mental entities (human beings).  
In the remainder of this section I use the terms ‘mental entities’ 
and ‘social entities’ to refer respectively to human individuals — 
taken as agents, whose action can be described lawfully and 
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teleologically by means of a psychological theory — and to social 
institutions — described by a social theory. For instance, according 
to Ruben, the social entity France is not reducible to the (exten-
sional) enumeration of the human individuals considered as being 
French.  
According to my view, it is relative to a psychological theory 
that we can point out the entities our human individuals, taken as 
agents, whose action or behavior is to be described. The theory’s 
ontology involves occurrences of two types, namely entities and 
events. Action or behavior is classes of events that involve human 
individuals. In addition, we attribute to human individuals certain 
properties, responsible for the relationships in which such individu-
als’ shared behavior or action consists.  
In addition, a social (or sociological) theory enables us to point 
out social entities or individuals (the ones I call institutions), whose 
behavior is described by the theory. According to such a social 
ontology, there are also occurrences of two types, i.e. entities and 
events. Since social entities are institutions, social events are de-
scribed by the theory based on the (social) properties of institu-
tions. For instance, the fall of the Bastille is a social event described 
by a social theory as being the event involving at least one social 
institution, namely the Bastille. In fact, it is well known that such 
an event involved many different institutions. According to my 
teleological approach, the fall of the Bastille is a social event that 
fits in another larger one — the French Revolution. Thus, accord-
ing to such a social scheme, it is as a function of a number of prop-
erties of French institutions by the end of the eighteenth century 
— such as the Bastille prison, the absolutist monarchy, the opposi-
tion to the regime, etc. — taken as being social individuals that we 
can explain the event we name by the term ‘the French Revolu-
tion’.  
Now, from the perspective of Quine’s criterion of ontological 
commitment, the question to be asked at this juncture is: “Does 
our talk about the French Revolution commit us to its existence as 
a social individual?” Of course, Davidson would say it does, but, 
according to the present analysis, the answer is “no.” The French 
Revolution is an occurrence of type 2, i.e. a social event or phe-
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nomenon. According to my criterion of ontological density, taken 
literally, our talk commit us to the existence of social entities or 
individuals or occurrences of type 1, such as the Bastille and the 
absolutist monarchy, i.e. the institutions involved in that great 
social event, the French Revolution.  
Even if this use of the criterion of ontological density is accept-
able, the remaining question is obviously about the role played by 
mental or psychological entities, human beings, in social events. 
According to the scheme of a psychological theory here argued for, 
how can we connect the action of individuals or psychological enti-
ties (agents) such as Louis XVI and Robespierre, for instance, to 
the French Revolution taken as a social event? From the viewpoint 
of a non-reductionist approach supposing the specificity of the dif-
ferent ontologies — social and psychological — we can’t say that 
the French Revolution is an event due to the action of Louis XVI 
and Robespierre, among other agents, in virtue of their beliefs, 
desires, volitions and intentions. This is how Davidson would ex-
plain it. What is then my alternative way of explaining the French 
Revolution without any resort to beliefs, desires, volitions and in-
tentions attributed to Louis XVI and Robespierre, among other 
agents?  
The point is that we can attribute to Louis XVI and Robespi-
erre, like any other agents whose action or behavior is described by 
a psychological theory or a theory of action, certain properties, such 
as their beliefs, volitions, etc. But it is not such properties that, in a 
social scheme, can explain events such as the French Revolution. 
From a social viewpoint, Louis XVI and Robespierre are still agents 
or, more specifically, social actors, but they are so described in vir-
tue of their belonging to certain social institutions, such as the 
absolutist monarchy and the opposition to the regime, respectively. 
From this point of view, the human individuals Louis XVI and 
Robespierre are classes of patterns of behavior. Those of their be-
haviors that fit in the social contexts involved in the episode of the 
French Revolution are given a teleological explanation. In other 
words, Louis XVI and Robespierre acted as they acted not in virtue 
of their beliefs and volitions, etc., but because their actions fitted in 
that social context of the French Revolution.  
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Human individuals other than Louis XVI and Robespierre, 
once put in those same social circumstances, would probably act in 
a way very similar to the one they followed. This is due in part to 
the fact that social circumstances and institutions model the indi-
viduals’ behaviors to a large extent, and likewise their abstract 
counterparts, such as beliefs, volitions, etc.; but also because, put in 
the same social circumstances, human agents must act choosing 
among a limited number of options, sometimes a very small number 
of alternative courses of action, which can fit in the social context 
where action is to take place. Thus, even avoiding the reduction of 
the mental to the social, we can say that the social determines the 
mental not less than the physical. We are not only before a world 
of inexorable physical determinism, but also of social determinism.  
In order to avoid that Davidson and Kant despair altogether, 
this doesn't mean, however, that there are no circumstances where 
freedom and rationality are present. But those circumstances are 
socially, as well as physically, determined. Indeed, such possibilities 
of free and rational actions are supplied by a number of social con-
texts. Rationality and freedom can be socially constructed, and 
they are indeed found in specific social contexts. The democratic 
system is one of them, besides philosophy and science themselves, 
taken as institutions.  
If human action can be given this teleological explanation, 
where does it rest its lawful character? To the extent that a social 
theory describes a social system suitably and shows the articulation 
between its different contexts and institutions, if there are regulari-
ties disclosed, they point to social (or sociological) laws. Similar to 
Davidson’s arguments for a heterodox identity theory (of the physi-
cal and the mental), at this juncture, there seems to be no other 
alternative than arguing for an identity theory of the mental and 
the social. But such identity theory is still a heterodox one, like 
Davidson’s, for an event is mental or social depending on how it is 
described. More specifically, the social lawful regularities involve 
regularities of the behavior of human individuals.  
This doesn’t mean, however, that there can’t be lawful regulari-
ties specifically psychological, independent from social regularities. 
It means just that a part of our behavior can be teleologically ex-
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plained because it fits in certain social contexts that exhibit social 
lawful regularities. Typical mental regularities take place in those 
contexts where action can be described as typically free and ra-
tional, like in the context of free elections in a democratic system. 
This is where the kind of explanation of action Davidson argues for 
is suitable. It is where we can describe action as rational and due to 
beliefs, volitions, etc., of human agents. But, in this case, actions 
aren't individuals but events that involve human individuals.  
 
 
5. Conclusion: Psychology as a Science dealing with  
General Events 
 
Following Kant, Davidson is concerned with saving human ration-
ality and freedom in a world of physical determinism. As I argued 
for in the previous section, it is possible to add to their concerns 
those ones typical of the materialist tradition Neurath belongs to, 
which has its major exponent in Marx. According to this tradition, 
the social determination of action is not less important than any 
physical determination.  
If my alternative approach is acceptable, then an important 
conclusion follows, which is contrary to Davidson’s stance. If psy-
chology is taken as being a science of lawful regularities that states 
laws, similarly to the physical sciences, then it is a science con-
cerned with explaining general events, not individual ones, as 
maintains Davidson. More specifically, single events can be given 
the kind of explanation Davidson argues for in specific social con-
texts.  
In addition, we can say that psychology doesn’t explain indi-
vidual action, but kinds of action, depending on the possibility that 
a research program in psychology discloses lawful regularities. 
Likewise, if a research program in the other social sciences, such as 
sociology and economics, does find out lawful regularities and, ac-
cording to them, we can describe certain social contexts where 
certain patterns of action fit in, then we can also give teleological 
explanations of those patterns of action, which have in such social 
contexts their final causes.  
Principia 9 (1–2), Florianópolis, June/December 2005, pp. 43–71. How Serious is our Ontological Commitment to Events as Individuals?  69
In this paper I tried to discuss the underpinnings of an alterna-
tive approach that, in its turn, tries to avoid a number of dogmas of 
traditional analytic philosophy, which is influenced by analyses 
such as Quine’s and Davidson’s, like those ones I discussed above. 
Not only the adoption of an Aristotelian view of causes is necessary 
to such an alternative approach to stand, but we have also to im-
prove on the criterion of ontological commitment, which is central 
to Davidson's analyses of human events and actions, with the more 
accurate criterion of ontological density.  
From this alternative approach not only a new image of the so-
cial sciences as being nomological sciences emerges, just like the 
physical sciences, but also a new image of psychology as a no-
mological science dealing with kinds of mental events that can't be 
taken into account independently from the social contexts they fit 
in. Thus, as opposed to what Davidson supposes, the challenge is 
not to compare mental events with physical events, but with social 
events.
1  
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Resumo 
 
Este artigo procura discutir o uso que Davidson faz com relação a even-
tos do critério de compromisso ontológico de Quine. De acordo com Da-
vidson, estamos ontologicamente comprometidos com a existência de e-
ventos como indivíduos quando empregamos literalmente expressões co-
mo ‘a morte de César’, por exemplo. Davidson estende essa análise tam-
bém às ações, uma vez que elas são eventos humanos. Uma das conse-
qüências dessa concepção é que a psicologia lida com eventos individuais 
de uma forma não-nomológica. Uma concepção alternativa é proposta 
aqui, baseada em um critério complementar, a saber, a densidade onto-
lógica, de acordo com o qual, do ponto de vista de dada teoria, podemos 
sempre distinguir entre eventos (ou fenômenos) e indivíduos (ou entida-
des) destre as ocorrências que em geral são descritas pela teoria. Algu-
mas conseqüências dessa concepção alternativa da psicologia como uma 
ciência que lida de forma nomológica com eventos humanos gerais tam-
bém são discutidas aqui.  
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